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This appeal concerns the dismissal of a petition seeking judicial review of an order 
of Appellee Kent L. Jones (the "State Engineer") approving Appellee Central Iron 
County Water Conservancy District's ("CICWCD") application to appropriate water 
from the Wah Wah Valley, Beaver County, Utah. Appellants Utah Alunite Corp. 
("UAC") and Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") raise 
\/El) two questions on appeal. First, did the district· court err in holding that UAC and SITLA 
must be "parties" to obtain judicial review of an order of the State Engineer when Utah 
Code Ann.§ 73-3-14{l)(a) allows a "person aggrieved" by the order to seek judicial 
review? Second, did the district court err when it failed to consider whether UAC and 
SITLA satisfied exceptions to the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(b)? 
A. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Because UAC and SITLA Are "Per~on[s] Aggrieved" by the CICWCD 
Order, They Can Obtain Judicial Review of the Order Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a). 
1. The District Court Had the Opportunity to Rule on, and Did Rule on, 
the Issue of Whether UAC and SITLA Could Bring This Action as 
"Person[s] Aggrieved" Under Section 73-3-14(l)(a). 
In their opening brief, UAC and SITLA explained that the district court erred as a 
matter of law finding that they had to be a "party" to obtain judicial review of the 
CICWCD Order. (UAC/SITLA Br. at 11-16.) Contrary to the district court's decision, 
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) expressly allows a "person aggrieved by an order of the 
state engineer" to "obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Utah 
- 1 -
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Administrative Procedures Act ["UAPA"], and this section." (Emphasis added.) 
According to.CICWCD and the State Engineer, UAC and SITLA did not present that 
issue to the district court and the district court did not consider it. (CICWCD Br. at 10-
14; State Engineer Br. at 14-15.)1 The record proves otherwise. 
Utah courts generally will not consider issues, arguments, or matters raised for the 
first time on appeal. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,I 12,266 P.3d 828. As 
explained in Patterson, the rule is based on considerations of judicial economy and 
fairness. 2011 UT 68, ,I 15. Judicial economy is furthered by giving ''the trial court an 
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, preservation turns on whether an issue "has 
been 'presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule 
on [it].'" 2011 UT 68, 112 (brackets in original; citation omitted). 
Here, the issue ofUAC and SITLA's standing under Section 73-3-14(l)(a) was 
preserved before the district court. In opposition to CICWCD and the State Engineer's 
motion to dismiss, UAC and SITLA specifically argued that the statute gave them 
standing as a "person aggrieved" to maintain their petition for judicial review (R.92), and 
that, in addition, they had satisfied the underlying purpose of the exhaustion requirement 
1 While the State Engineer contends UAC and SITLA should be unable to raise 
Section N.A.2 of their opening brief, CICWCD appears to argue that UAC and SITLA 





(R.92-95).2 In response to those arguments, CICWCD and the State Engineer argued that 
~ under Utah Code Ann.§§ 63G-4-401 and -402, only a "party aggrieved" may obtain 
judicial review of a final agency action. (R.271-72, 307-08.) 
Undoubtedly as a result, the district court perceived the issue as whether UAC and 
SITLA could bring the action as a "person aggrieved" under Section 73-3-14(1)(a). 
(R.356.) As the district court stated, "[t]he Petitioners assert the right to bring this action 
pursuant to Section 73-3-14(1)(a), Utah Code, wherein, 'A person aggrieved by an order 
of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, .... "' (Id.) Despite that, the district court did not address 
Section 73-3-14(1)(a) or the interplay with the UAPA. Instead, the district court-turned 
exclusively to what it means to obtain judicial review in accordance with the UAP A and 
whether the UAP A controls the right to judicial review in this case. In particular, the 
district court discussed Utah Code Ann.§§ 63G-4-402 (for "the law regarding judicial 
~ review of informal adjudicative proceedings"), 63G-4-401 (which "limits judicial review 
actions to a 'party"'), and 63G-4-103(l)(f) (which ''states the definition of the term 
'party"'). (R.356-57.) 
Based on this, the district court concluded that "UAC and SITLA do not fit the 
definition of party and they did not seek to protest." (R.358 (emphasis in original).) In 
doing so, the district court incorrectly interpreted Section 73-3-14(1)(a) together with the 
2 Alternatively, UAC and SITLA argued that they should be excused from the 
requirement of exhaustion pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(b). (R.95-98.) 
-3-
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UAP A to mean that only a "party" can seek judicial review of an order of the State 
Engineer and considered the interplay between the statutes. (R.356-57.) The district 
court thus had an opportunity to, and did in fact, rule on whether UAC and SITLA were 
aggrieved persons under Section 73-3-14(l)(a). Because the issue ofUAC and SITLA's 
right to petition for judicial review under Section 73-3-14(l)(a) was presented to the 
district court and the district court considered and addressed it, the issue was preserved. 
2. The Plain Language of Section 73-3-14(1)(a) Allows a "Person 
Aggrieved" to Obtain Judicial Review of a State Engineer's Order 
Under the UAP A and "This Section." 
In this appeal, UAC and SITLA rely on the plain and express language of Section 
73-3-14(1)(a) to support their right to seek judicial review of the State·Engineer's order 
approving CICWCD's application. (See UAC/SITLA Br. at 11-13.) Despite that plain 
language, CICWCD and the State Engineer contend, just as the district court found, that 
the UAPA controls UAC and SITLA's right to judicial review under Section 73-3-
14(1)(a). (CICWCD Br. at 15-22; State Engineer Br. at 10-22.) CICWCD and the State 
Engineer rely primarily on the language of Utah Ann. Code § 63 G-4-102( 1 ), which _they 
both maintain trumps Section 73-3-14(1)(a). (See id.) 
Section 63G-4-102(1) states that "except-as otherwise provide~ by a statute 
superseding provisions of thfs chapter by explicit reference to this ch~pter, the provisions 
of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: (a) state agency action that 
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, [or] immunities ... ; and (b) judicial review 
of the action." There is little case law interpreting Section 630-4-102(1) and none 
-4-
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expressly weighing the impact of the provisions to Section 73-3-14. Regardless, 
;;;; CICWCD and the State Engineer misconstrue the effect of the provision as it relates to 
Section 73-3-14 based on the plain language of the statutes. 
~ 
By it~ plain language, Section 63G-4-102(1) allows a statute to supersede the 
provi~ions of the UAPA by explicit reference to the UAPA. Section 73-3-14(1)(a) does 
just that. It specifically provides that "[a] person aggrieved by an order of the state 
engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section." Id ( emphasis added). Thus, under the 
statute, the right to judicial review is governed by the UAPA and Section 73-3-14 itself. 
By explicitly referring to both the UAP A and itself, Section 73-3-14 allows a "person 
aggrieved" to obtain judicial review, superseding the UAPA. 
That Section 73-3-14 supersedes the UAPA by explicit reference is confirmed by 
the entirety of the statute, as it dictates what "a person" is required to do and not do when 
\IJ filing a petition for judicial review. For example, 
• Section 73-3-14(3) states that "[a] person who files apetitionfor judicial 
review as authorized in this section shall" name the State Engineer as a 
respondent in the petition and provide written notice of the petition in 
accordance with Section 73-3-14(5). (Emphasis added.) 
• Section 73-3-14(6) states what happens "[i]f a person who files a petition for 
judicial review fails to provide notice as required by this section": the court 
shall dismiss the petition without prejudice. (Emphasis added.) 
-5-
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• Section 73-3-14(7) states that "{a] person who files a petition for judicial 
review is not required to," notwithstanding the UAP A, "name a respondent that 
is not required by this section" or "identify all parties to the adjudicative 
proceeding." (Emphasis added.) 
It follows that by explicitly referencing the UAPA "and this section," Section 73-3-14 is 
a statute superseding provisions of the UAPA as contemplated by Section 63G-4-102(1). 
Specifically, a "person aggrieved" by order of the State Engineer is expressly allowed to 
obtain judicial review under the UAP A "and this section." 
Sections 63G-4-401 and -402 are thus superseded by Section 73-3-14 and are 
rendered general enactments governing judicial review of final actions taken by the State 
Engineer. (See also UAC/SITLA Br. at 11-16.) The State Engineer's administrative 
rules cannot change that reality. (See CICWCD Br. at 15, 17-18, 20.) While Utah 
Admin. Code R655-6-18(A) provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved" by an order of the 
State Engineer can seek judicial review, an agency's rules must be consistent with its 
governing statute and cannot "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a] statute." 
Draughon v. Dep't of Fin. Institutions, State of Utah, 1999 UT App 42, 15,975 P.2d 935 
(brackets in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court's holdings in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P .2d 1085 
(Utah 1990), and Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement District v. Olds, 2009 UT 86, 
224 P.3d 709, also cannot rewrite Section 73-3-14. As explained in UAC and SITLA's 
opening brief, S & G addressed a prior version of Section 73-3-14 that did not expressly 
-6-
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incorporate the UAPA, as the current statute does. (UAC/SITLA Br. at 20-21.) The 
viJ issue in Taylor-West Weber was whether a nonparty can intervene in the de novo review 
of the State Engineer's order in the district court pursuant to the Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24. 2009 UT 86, ,r 1. The nonparty did not seek to initiate judicial review 
under Section 73-3-14 and the UAPA.3 As the Court noted in Taylor-West Weber, "an 
intervenor is not the same as a party seeking judicial review." 2009 UT 86, ,r 8. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Failed to Consider Whether UAC and 
SITLA May Be Relieved from the Requirement to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2){b ). 
UAC and SITLA also explained in their opening brief that there are exceptions to 
the UAPA's exhaustion requirements. (See UAC/SITLA Br. at 16-17.) Specifically, 
Utah Code Ann. § · 63G-4-401 (2)(b) allows the district court to "relieve a party seeking 
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: (i) the 
administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion." Because UAC and SITLA were entitled to seek judicial review under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 in accordance with the UAPA and that section, the district court 
erred when it did not consider whether they should be relieved from exhaustion 
requirements. (Id. at 18-20.) 
3 In addition, Taylor-West Weber concerned a petitioner who intentionally failed to 
participate in a hearing before the State Engineer, despite an existing interest. 2009 UT 
'..iv 86, ,r 1. As explained further below, that is not the case here. 
-7-
79051458.7 0046574-00009 
CICWCD and the State Engineer. do not address this issue directly but instead 
contend that the exceptions do not apply because UAC and SITLA could have, but did 
not, participate to the adjudication of CICWCD's application.4 (See CICWCD Br. at 22-
30; State Engineer Br. at 26-32.) CICWCD and the State Engineer's contentions are 
addressed in tum. 
1. Because the State Engineer Waited Nearly Eight Years to Rule on 
CICWCD's Application, UAC and SITLA Had No Opportunity to 
Participate in That Administrative Proceeding. 
According to CICWCD, UAC and SITLA had a right to participate in the 
adjudication of CICWCD's application but chose not to and thus waived their right to 
pursue this appeal. (CICWCD Br. at 24-30.) In particular, CICWCD contends that UAC 
and SITLA could have changed the proceeding from an informal to a formal adjudication 
and then intervened to protest the application under the UAP A. If that argument had 
merit, one would expect the State Engineer to raise it as well. But the State Engineer 
does not, undoubtedly because-as the State Engineer knows-his administrative rules 
do not allow intervention. 
The State Engineer's rules designate that all adjudicative proceedings are informal 
proceedings. Utah Admin. Code R655-6-2. "Intervention is prohibited except where a 
4 CICWCD does contend that the district court considered the exhaustion exceptions 
and refused to apply them. (See CICWCD Br. at 23 ( citing R.358-60).) Nothing in the 
distr_ict court's decision, however, supports that contention. The district court simply 
considered this question: ifUAC and SITLA could overcome their lack of"party" status, 
have they exhausted their administrative remedies? (R.358.) The district court did not 
cite or consider the exceptions under Section 63G-4-401(2)(b)(i) or (ii). (See R.358-60.) 
- 8 -
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federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention." Utah Admin. Code R655-
i.;j) 6-8 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-203(1)(g). Despite those 
limitations, CICWCD argues that UAC and SITLA could have changed the application 
from an informal proceeding to a formal proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
4-202(3) and then intervened pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-207. CICWCD is 
incorrect. As nonparties, UAC and SITLA could not have converted the proceeding 
when intervention was expressly prohibited in the first place. See Butler v. Wilkinson, 
740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987) ("A court may not grant relief to a nonparty."). 
Beyond that, the State Engineer's prohibition on intervention undermines 
CICWCD's reliance on Republic Outdoor Advertising, LC v. Utah Department of 
Transportation, 2011 UT App 198, 1121, 34,258 P.3d 619 (holding plaintiff could have 
requested informal administrative proceeding on challenged billboard permits be 
converted to formal proceedings to allow intervention). In that decision, this Court 
·'4f) considered a nonparty's right to intervene in a formal adjudication overseen by the Utah 
Department of Transportation. 2011 UT App 198, ,r,r 19, 20. Unlike the State Engineer's 
rules here, the Department of Transportation's rules did not contain a prohibition on 
~ 
intervention. · See Utah Admin. Code R907- l. Thus, in Republic Outdoor Advertising, 
the nonparty had a right to and could intervene. See id. That is not the case here. 
Next, CICWCD relies on Republic Outdoor Advertising to argue that UAC and 
SITLA cannot satisfy the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement under Section 63G-4-
401(2)(b). (CICWCD Br. at 26-29.) There, however, the district court considered and 
-9-
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ultimately found that the exhaustion exceptions did not apply, and this Court affirmed 
that determination. 2011 UT App 198, 1134-37. Here, as already noted, the district 
court did not consider the exhaustion exceptions; it only found that UAC and SITLA,_ if 
parties, failed to exhaust their available administrative remedies. (R.358-60.) 
And, even if the district court had considered the exceptions, as already noted, the 
facts and administrative procedure at issue in Republic Outdoor Advertising are far 
different from the facts and procedure here. • Here, the State Engineer waited nearly eight 
years to issue the CICWCD Order, a delay that prevented UAC and SITLA from 
participating in those proceedings. (See R.4 ,r 12; R.5 1 18.) Nevertheless, throughout 
that period, the State Engineer had a statutory duty to investigate and determine whether 
CICWCD's application would "interfere with the more beneficial use of the water" or 
"prove detrimental to the public welfare." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-8(1)(a)(ii), (b)(i). 
Further, its own rules require that an order stating his decision "shall be based on the 
facts appearing in any of the Division's files or records and on the facts presented in 
evidence at any hearings." Utah Admin. CodeR655-6-16(A) (emphases added). 
Here, the State Engineer held a hearing on UAC and SITLA's application for 
water rights in Wah Wah Valley in November 2013. (R.7138; R.187.) At that time, 
CICWCD's application had been pending for over seven years, having been filed in 
October 2006 and heard in July 2010. (R.4 at 1112, 16; R. 16.) The extreme delay in 
ruling on CICWCD's application required the State Engineer to investigate whether there 
was a more beneficial use for the Wah Wah Valley's water and consider facts in any of 
- 10-
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its records or presented at any hearings. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(ii), (b)(i); 
~ Utah Admin. Code R655-6-16(A). 
Accordingly, the State Engineer did not rule on CICWCD's application until after 
he held a hearing on UAC and SITLA's application. (See R.7-8 at ,I 39.) In addition, 
CICWCD participated as a protestant in that hearing. (See R.1 at ,I 37; R.187, 191-92.) 
Six months later, in May 2014, the State Engineer ruled on CICWCD's application and 
UAC and SITLA's application a day apart. (R.7-8 at ,r 39.) By doing so, he considered 
the applications as competing interests for the same water and ultimately determined that 
CICWCD's interest and UAC and SITLA's interest "can reasonably be expected to 
coexist.,, (R.105 at ,I 9; R.191-92.) 
The basic purpose of the exhaustion requirement was thus satisfied. See Republic 
Outdoor Adver., 2011 UT App 198, ,I 33 (explaining purpose of doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies: to allow agency to make factual record, apply its expertise, and 
correct errors). The State Engineer made a factual record on both applications for water 
rights in Wah Wah Valley and addressed the applications together. Exhaustion was .thus 
not required, as the administrative remedies available to UAC and SITLA were 
inadequate, served no purpose, and would result in irreparable harm given the nearly 
eight-year delay it took the State Engineer to rule on CICWCD's application. Because 
·"69 the district court failed to consider the exceptions under Section 63G-4-401 (2)(b ), its 
decision should be vacated and remanded for consideration of the exceptions. 
- 11 -
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2. Because the State Engineer Waited Nearly Eight Years to Rule on 
CICWCD's Application, UAC and SITLA Did Not Delay Asserting an 
Interest in CICWCD's Application and Should Not be Precluded from 
Seeking Judicial Review. 
The State Engineer takes a different tack than CICWCD with respect UAC and 
SITLA's inability to participate in the administrative proceedings on CICWCD's 
application. Specifically, for the first time on appeal, the State Engineer contends UAC 
and SITLA are not entitled to judicial review because they "slumbered" and "sat on their 
hands" in asserting their interest in the application. (See State Engineer Br. at 26-28.) 
The State Engineer also contends that public policy justifies the dismissal of UAC and 
SITLA's petition. (See id. at 28-32.) 
In support of these contentions, the State Engineer speculates, as did the district 
court (R.357), that SITLA had an interest in water rights from Wah Wah Valley in 
October 2006, when CICWCD filed its application.5 (State Engineer Br. at 27-28.) 
There is nothing in the record that shows that SITLA had any interest at that time. (See 
UAC/SITLA Br. at 7 n.2.) But even if SITLA did have an interest, it still had no 
opportunity to meaningfully protest the application. The State Engineer held the 
evidentiary hearing in July 2010-almost a year before UAC entered into an agreement 
with SITLA to explore a possible mining development (R.6 at ~ 27)-and then waited 
over three more years to issue an order on CICWCD' s application. 
5 CICWCD makes a similar argument at pages 24-25 of its brief. 
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The State Engineer cannot flip the inequities and burden of the almost eight 
LiP years-from October 2006 to May 2014-it took to investigate and rule on CICWCD's 
application. The situation here was created by the State Engineer. Further, the 
information surrounding CICWCD's application changed in the intervening eight years, 
leaving the State Engineer with no choice but to investigate and consider whether there 
was a more beneficial use of that water and the true impact to the public welfare. See 
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-8{l)(a)(ii), (b)(i); Utah Admin. Code R655-6-16(A). The years 
of delay thus allowed the State Engineer to consider and weigh ~e competing 
applications for water rights in Wah Wah Valley. 
* * * 
In sum, the district court should have considered whether UAC and SITLA 
satisfied exceptions to the requirement to exhaust adminfstrative remedies under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 63G-4-401(2)(b). UAC and SITLA were not "strangers" to the State 
,~ Engineer's actions. (State Engineer Br. at 30.) The State Engineer failed to act on 
CICWCD's application for nearly eight years, and that delay created circumstances 
where it appears exhaustion would serve no useful purpose or where it appears there is a 










For the reasons above, UAC and SITLA respectfully request that the Court reverse 
the district court's dismissal of their petition for judicial review and remand this case to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED: June 17, 2015. 
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